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Raising the Safety Bar — The FDA’s Coxib Meeting

PERSPECTIVE

Learning the Value of Drugs — Is Rofecoxib a Regulatory
Success Story?
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, J.D.
Controversy over recent revelations concerning the
adverse cardiovascular effects of selective cyclooxygenase-2 (COX-2) inhibitors has generally been
framed as a story of regulatory failure, in which the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has failed in
its mission to protect the public from unsafe products. But this simplistic understanding of the mission of the FDA seems to make failure all but inevitable, if the reliable observation of the risks and
benefits of a drug requires rigorous long-term studies. Perhaps in an earlier era the goal of drug regulation was simply to protect the public from poisons.1
Today, drug regulation guides the development of
information that turns poisons, used advisedly, into
drugs. From this perspective, the growing knowledge of the complex effects of COX-2 inhibitors
might be retold as a story of regulatory success.
Drugs are information-rich chemicals that in
some respects resemble other information products (such as databases) more than they do other
chemicals (such as industrial solvents). Information derived from rigorous testing distinguishes
the chemicals we call “drugs” from similar chemicals sold for other purposes or even for the same
purposes (such as minimally regulated dietary supplements). Creating new molecules has become
relatively cheap, but determining their effects in
patients has remained stubbornly expensive, timeconsuming, and risky.2 Moreover, the job is never
finished. Years after a product has appeared on the

market, further studies may reveal that it is useless or even toxic in patients with an indication for
which it was once widely prescribed (e.g., hormonereplacement therapy for the prevention of heart disease in postmenopausal women) or, conversely, that
a product once withdrawn because of toxic effects
has unsuspected therapeutic benefits (e.g., thalidomide for leprosy). Information about drug effects
is an extremely valuable resource for guiding both
sound therapeutic choices and future product development.
Although we rely primarily on pharmaceutical
firms to supply this information, we have reason to
worry that, in an unregulated market, these firms
would provide either too little information or distorted information. Getting profit-seeking companies to provide reliable information about the effects of drugs in patients is thus a major challenge
for regulators.
One problem that is common to many markets
for information products is that firms that produce
the information may be unable to capture its value. Suppose a seller of unpatented dietary supplements believes that it could increase demand for
its products by conducting clinical trials to convince skeptics that the products are safe and effective. At best, the seller would have to share this expanded market with competitors who did not pay
for the trials. Facing this competition, it could not
raise its prices, even though the tested product
would be worth more to consumers than the unMs. Eisenberg is a professor of law at the University of tested product. The trials would look like a poor
Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor.
investment.
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Patents mitigate this problem by allowing firms
to exclude competitors from the market and, thus,
to set prices that reflect the enhanced value to consumers of the information-rich product — but
only up to a point. As the end of the patent term approaches, a firm may find it hard to recover the costs
of clinical trials by selling a product at a premium
price before competition comes into play. Patents
therefore do more to promote the early testing of
new drugs than the further testing of old drugs.
FDA-administered periods of market exclusivity
sometimes provide additional motivation for testing old drugs.3
A more intractable problem is that firms have
no way to capture the value of negative information. Clinical trials may increase demand if they
show that a drug is safe and effective, but they will
reduce demand if they show the opposite. The information is socially valuable either way, but the
value of negative information accrues entirely to
patients, insurers, and sellers of substitute products, rather than to the drug’s manufacturer.
A recent case in point is rofecoxib (Vioxx). After
receiving FDA approval in the late 1990s to market
rofecoxib for the treatment of pain and inflammation associated with osteoarthritis, menstruation,
and rheumatoid arthritis, Merck pursued additional trials of the drug for the prevention of recurrent
colonic polyps. These trials confirmed previous
indications that treatment with rofecoxib increases
the risk of serious cardiovascular events.4 This is
lifesaving information that has considerable value
to patients, doctors, scientists, insurers, and competitors. But from the viewpoint of Merck and its
shareholders, the information destroyed value.
This radical difference in perspective makes it imprudent to rely on the unfettered judgment of pharmaceutical firms to determine what we learn about
the effects of drugs.
Firms face powerful incentives to develop and
disclose information selectively, and perhaps even
to delude themselves, in order to maximize sales.
FDA regulation constrains these impulses by providing oversight of trial design, scrutiny of results
by FDA scientists and outside experts, and assurance that marketing claims correspond to underlying data.1 Consider, again, Merck’s fateful decision to test rofecoxib for the prevention of recurrent
colonic polyps. By this point, data from a prior study
comparing rofecoxib with naproxen had suggested
that cardiovascular risk was increased among patients taking rofecoxib. Although Merck optimisti-
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cally attributed the difference to protective effects
of naproxen rather than to toxic effects of rofecoxib, Merck scientists surely realized that further data
could potentially support either hypothesis. Why
would Merck take such a risk with a product that
had sales of $2.5 billion a year?
Without dismissing the motivating power of
scientific integrity and concern for public health, it
seems likely that regulatory considerations fortified
Merck’s resolve to pursue further trials. Regulatory
constraints on off-label marketing would limit available strategies for persuading doctors to prescribe
(and insurers to pay for) an expensive drug like rofecoxib for prophylactic use without FDA approval,
particularly in the face of questions about toxicity.
A similar study was already under way of Pfizer’s
rival product, celecoxib (Celebrex), threatening to
put Merck at a marketing disadvantage if celecoxib were approved for an indication that remained
off-label for rofecoxib. FDA oversight also undoubtedly helped to persuade Merck that the cardiovascular effects of rofecoxib called for further study.
Although the FDA has limited power to compel
firms to conduct post-marketing studies, it must
approve the labeling for drugs, and it has the authority to issue a public health advisory or even recall a product with adverse effects from the market,
giving it some leverage with manufacturers.1
Recent newspaper accounts report that Merck
marketing executives, reluctant to signal a lack of
confidence in rofecoxib, opposed a study focused
primarily on cardiovascular risks.5 Instead, Merck
decided, in consultation with the FDA, to monitor
data on these risks in ongoing studies of new indications, thereby signaling optimism about new
markets rather than concern about side effects. As
more data came in, the FDA reached agreement
with Merck to disclose the cardiovascular risks in
the rofecoxib label in 2002.4 Perhaps Merck hoped
that rigorous long-term studies, culminating in the
FDA’s imprimatur on a supplemental new drug application, would put this concern to rest.
Some commentators have argued that the FDA
should have required Merck to conduct trials designed primarily to evaluate cardiovascular toxic
effects, rather than simply observing cardiovascular side effects in trials designed to prove efficacy
for new indications.4 Perhaps a regulatory process
that gave a larger role in trial design to independent
regulators, rather than leaving it largely to manufacturers, would generate more information about
toxic effects at an earlier stage. But it is not obvious
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that doing so would provide more valuable information more quickly than the system we have now.
Studies testing efficacy and safety are more informative than those testing safety alone; indeed, it
is difficult to make sense of the concept of safety
apart from the vantage point of particular patient
populations and therapeutic goals. To rank safety
ahead of efficacy seems to miss the obvious point
that patients may be harmed by disease as well as
by drugs. The challenge for physicians is to know
which risks are worth taking for which patients —
an evaluation that requires understanding benefits
as well as risks. The challenge for regulators is to
see that the necessary information is developed
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and disseminated appropriately and that marketing
claims do not get ahead of the data. Only through
well-informed advice can physicians minimize harm
to patients.
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